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Tribes and Race: The Court’s Missed 
Opportunity in Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl 
 
Christopher Deluzio* 
 
Introduction 
 
Adoption policy in the United States has unequivocally embraced 
the idea that every child, irrespective of race, has an equal right to a 
loving home and supportive parents. To that end, public adoption 
agencies and family courts are largely barred from considering the race 
of either the child or the couple seeking adoption when deciding custody 
and placement issues. But there is one dramatic exception to this 
colorblindness: the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”). 
The ICWA is a radical and lingering departure from the steady 
embrace of colorblindness by both Congress and the Court. The Act 
creates heightened federal standards for termination of parental rights of 
an Indian parent, gives placement preference to tribe members and others 
in cases involving the placement of Indian children, and even extends 
jurisdiction—often exclusive—to tribes in certain custody and adoption 
proceedings. 
The divisive nature and tenuous constitutional footing of the ICWA 
were on full display most recently in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.
1
 In 
this heart-wrenching and widely publicized case,
2
 the Court tackled the 
 
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan, United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. magna cum 
laude (2013); United States Naval Academy, B.S. with merit (2006). First and foremost, I 
would like to thank Jeffrey Shulman for his unwavering mentorship and direction. I 
would also like to thank Peter Edelman, Michael Gottesman, Neal Katyal, and Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz at Georgetown Law for their steadfast support. As with every 
endeavor, I am deeply indebted to Zoë Bunnell for her love, patience, and counsel. 
1. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013). 
2. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Send Veronica Back: A Truly Terrible Ruling in the 
Baby Girl Custody Case, SLATE (Jul. 18, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/07/baby_veronica_case_the_south
_carolina_court_got_it_wrong.html; Andrew Cohen, What the Court’s ‘Baby Veronica’ 
Ruling Means for Fathers and Native Americans, ATLANTIC (Jun. 25, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/what-the-courts-baby-veronica-
1
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issue of whether the ICWA would operate to bar the adoption of a child 
with only 3/256 Cherokee blood by an adoptive couple personally 
selected by the child’s unwed biological mother. Effectively, before the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision, the South Carolina state courts 
felt compelled by the ICWA to grant custody to the child’s putative 
father solely because of the child’s Indian heritage, despite a family 
court’s finding that the adoption would have been in the best interests of 
the child. Worse, the child had spent over a year with the couple and 
formed strong familial bonds with her adoptive parents. 
Unlike other federal laws designed to protect and reinforce the self-
governance of tribes—rooted in the tribes’ inherent sovereignty and 
subjected to lower rational basis review—the ICWA in Adoptive Couple 
acted as a naked racial preference for those with Indian blood. The child 
at issue was not born to an Indian mother, had never met her biological 
father until his intervention in the adoption proceedings, and had never 
even stepped foot on a reservation prior to her adoption. The Supreme 
Court, seeking to avoid the difficult and obvious equal protection issues 
implicated in Adoptive Couple, inexplicably failed to acknowledge 
ICWA for what it was in this case: an inherently racial classification that 
should have been subjected to and failed strict scrutiny. Unfortunately, 
the Court never exposed ICWA to that kind of scrutiny; instead, the 
Court avoided the obvious constitutional questions raised by ICWA by 
relying on creative textual interpretation. 
Part I will provide an overview of the legal doctrines implicated in 
Adoptive Couple. First, Part I will discuss both ICWA’s text and purpose 
and scholarly attention given to the law. Second, Part I will examine the 
law of putative fathers insofar as relevant to understanding ICWA’s 
application in Adoptive Couple. Part II provides insight into the Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence with a particular emphasis on 
considerations of race in adoption and laws implicating Indian tribes. 
This Part introduces the limited scholarly treatment afforded to the equal 
protection issues implicated by ICWA and builds on the existing work 
that recognizes the inherently racial nature of any tribal classification. 
Part III tells the intriguing story of Adoptive Couple by providing a 
 
ruling-means-for-fathers-and-native-americans/277215/; Dan Frosch & Timothy 
Williams, Justices Saw Law Doesn’t Require Child to be Returned to her Indian Father, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/justices-order-
return-of-indian-child-to-adoptive-parents.html; S.M., The Native American Adoption 
Case: Thicker than Water, ECONOMIST (Jun. 12, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/06/native-american-
adoption-case. 
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factual overview of the case, presenting the procedural history of the 
dispute, and summarizing the parties’ arguments before the Supreme 
Court. Lastly, Part IV analyzes the Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple. 
Incorporating the themes developed throughout this Article, Part IV 
critically examines the Court’s failure to resolve the putative father and 
equal protection issues raised in Adoptive Couple. Part IV suggests how 
the Court should have resolved Adoptive Couple in a constitutionally and 
doctrinally satisfying way while identifying some of the perils and 
repercussions of the Court’s judicial minimalism. This Part also includes 
a brief epilogue that provides an update to the status of Baby Girl’s 
adoption. 
 
I. Legal Background 
 
This Part provides an overview of the legal doctrines and 
jurisprudence at play in Adoptive Couple.
3
 Section A begins with a 
discussion of the text and purpose of the ICWA before turning to an 
analysis of the contentious judicially crafted “existed Indian family 
doctrine” exception to the ICWA. Section B examines the law of putative 
fathers, first under the ICWA and, second, under the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decisions. 
 
A. ICWA 
 
Congress passed the ICWA in 1978 in response to the breakdown of 
Indian families caused by the removal of Indian children via state 
custody proceedings.
4
 In passing the ICWA, Congress laid out a broad 
and lofty policy of protecting Indian children, promoting Indian tribal 
identity, and preserving Indian culture. The ICWA established minimum 
federal guidelines for Indian child custody proceedings. Unfortunately, 
the ICWA has caused uncertainty about both the applicability of its 
provisions to non-custodial Indian parents—as evidenced by the 
emergence of a judicially-created “existing Indian family doctrine”—and 
the steps unwed Indian fathers must take in order to enjoy the 
 
3. Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. 2552. 
4. See Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978 § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2012) 
(finding “that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the 
removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private 
agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian 
foster and adoptive homes and institutions.”). 
3
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preferential treatment afforded by the ICWA. Section B addresses this 
latter concern relating to putative fathers. The constitutional equal 
protection objections and concerns posed by the ICWA are reserved for 
discussion in Part II. 
 
1. Purpose and Provisions of the ICWA 
 
Congress, in passing the ICWA, charted an intrusive federal role in 
the protection of Indian children, families, and tribal identity: 
 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of 
this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children 
and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes 
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal 
standards for the removal of Indian children from their 
families and the placement of such children in foster or 
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of 
Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian 
tribes in the operation of child and family service 
programs.
5
 
 
This active and seemingly intrusive federal involvement by Congress 
was couched in the general obligation of the United States to protect and 
preserve Indian tribes.
6
 Even a cursory review of the legislative history 
of the ICWA confirms that much of the congressional concern focused 
on the harm experienced by Indian children and their families.
7
 The 
 
5. Id. § 1902. 
6. Id. § 1901(2) (“Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of 
dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the protection and 
preservation of Indian tribes and their resources.”). 
7. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
7530, 7531 (“The wholesale separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps 
the most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today.”); id. (“In addition 
to the trauma of separation from their families, most Indian children in placement or in 
institutions have to cope with the problems of adjusting to a social and cultural 
environment much different than their own.”); id. at 10, 7532 (“In judging the fitness of a 
particular family, many social workers, ignorant of Indian cultural values and social 
norms, make decisions that are wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian family life 
and so they frequently discover neglect or abandonment where none exists.”); S. REP. 
NO. 95-597, at 11 (1977) (stating that the ICWA was motivated by “reports that an 
alarmingly high percentage of Indian children were being separated from their natural 
parents through the actions of nontribal government agencies”). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/1
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Supreme Court has also noted that Congress, via the ICWA, aimed to 
remedy the harm caused by the breakdown of Indian families: 
 
The . . . ICWA . . . was the product of rising concern in 
the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian 
children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive 
child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of 
large numbers of Indian children from their families and 
tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually 
in non-Indian homes.
8
 
 
More specifically, Congress zeroed in on the effects of custody 
proceedings in the States on Indian families, finding “that the States, 
exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody 
proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed 
to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural 
and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”9 In 
order to remedy these destructive forces in the States, the ICWA 
included implementation of “minimum Federal standards” governing the 
removal of Indian children from Indian families. As such, the ICWA is 
best characterized as an atypical foray by the federal government into 
substantive family law, which the Court has typically characterized as 
the exclusive domain of the States.
10
 
The ICWA’s substantive provisions apply to child custody 
proceedings in the states involving an “Indian Child,” which the ICWA 
defines as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either 
(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an 
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”11 
A “parent” under the ICWA is “any biological parent or parents of an 
 
8. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989); see also id. 
at 34 (noting that congressional testimony during the debates surrounding passage of the 
ICWA included significant focus “on the harm to Indian parents and their children who 
were involuntarily separated by decisions of local welfare authorities”); id. at 55 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Act is thus primarily addressed to the unjustified removal 
of Indian children from their families through the application of standards that 
inadequately recognized the distinct Indian culture.”). 
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5). 
10. See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (“The whole 
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the 
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.” (quoting In re Burrus, 136 
U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890))). 
11. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
5
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Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian 
child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom.”12 However, the 
ICWA’s definition of parent “does not include the unwed father where 
paternity has not been acknowledged or established.”13 
Relevant to adoption proceedings, the ICWA significantly restricts 
the ability of state courts to terminate a “parent’s” custody rights without 
consent: 
 
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such 
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported 
by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including 
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the 
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian 
custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or 
physical damage to the child.
14
 
 
The ICWA also gives adoption placement preferences to the extended 
family of the Indian child and other tribal members.
15
 The ICWA also 
provides Indian tribes with exclusive jurisdiction over child custody 
proceedings involving Indian children domiciled or residing on the 
tribe’s reservation,16 transfer to Indian tribes of proceedings to terminate 
the parental rights to an Indian child (subject to parental objection),
17
 and 
Indian tribes with the right to intervene in proceedings to terminate the 
 
12. Id. § 1903(9). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. § 1912(f) (emphasis added). 
15. See id. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State 
law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a 
placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the 
Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”). 
16. See id. § 1911(a) (“An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any 
State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is 
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise 
vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal 
court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or 
domicile of the child.”). 
17. See id. § 1911(b) (“In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement 
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within 
the reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the 
contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection 
by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian 
child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal 
court of such tribe.”). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/1
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parental rights to an Indian child.
18
 
Thus, state courts dealing with the adoption of an Indian child must 
apply a high federal standard of harm despite any contrary state law, 
consider the ICWA’s tribal placement preferences, allow Indian tribes to 
intervene, and transfer to Indian tribes if neither parent objects and a 
parent, custodian, or tribe petitions the court. And for children residing or 
domiciled on a reservation, Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over 
all child custody proceedings. 
 
2. Existing Indian Family Doctrine 
 
The “existing Indian family doctrine”—a judicially crafted 
exception to the ICWA—limits the reach of the ICWA to only Indian 
children being removed from the existing custody of an Indian parent or 
family.
19
 The doctrine first emerged in a 1982 decision by the Kansas 
Supreme Court: 
 
A careful study of the legislative history behind the 
[Indian Child Welfare] Act and the Act itself discloses 
that the overriding concern of Congress and the 
proponents of the Act was the maintenance of the family 
and tribal relationships existing in Indian homes and to 
set minimum standards for the removal of Indian 
children from their existing Indian environment. It was 
not to dictate that an illegitimate infant who has never 
been a member of an Indian home or culture, and 
probably never would be, should be removed from its 
primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian 
 
18. See id. § 1911(c) (“In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement 
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child 
and the Indian child's tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the 
proceeding.”). 
19. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare 
Act: Toward A New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 676 
n.8 (2002) (“Under the existing Indian family exception, several state courts have refused 
to apply the ICWA to children who otherwise qualify as Indian children under the Act, 
where neither the child nor the child's parents have a social, cultural, or political 
relationship with a tribe.”); Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D. L. REV. 465, 472 (1993) (describing the existing 
Indian family doctrine as “an exception based on the notion that the ICWA will only be 
applicable if an Indian child is removed from an ‘existing Indian family unit’ or ‘Indian 
home or culture’”). 
7
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environment over the express objections of its non-
Indian mother.
20
 
 
A court adhering to the doctrine and presiding over a parent termination 
proceeding, for instance, would not apply the ICWA’s substantive 
provisions to a parental termination proceeding, for instance, where the 
Indian child at issue was not already in the custody of an Indian parent. 
Although Kansas ultimately abandoned the doctrine,
21
 at least seven 
states currently embrace the existing Indian family doctrine: Alabama,
22
 
Kentucky,
23
 Indiana,
24
 Louisiana,
25
 Missouri,
26
 Nevada,
27
 and 
Tennessee.
28
 
The doctrine has received some attention from scholars, and this 
commentary has been almost uniformly critical.
29
 The principal objection 
to the doctrine attacks the judicial exemption as both a departure from 
the plain text of the ICWA and an infringement of tribal sovereignty. 
Professor Atwood, for instance, who provides an excellent discussion of 
the two-pronged objections to the doctrine, summarizes things quite 
nicely: “The exception, which rewrites the Act’s definition of ‘Indian 
child’ without statutory basis, undercuts the sovereign authority of tribes 
to determine their own membership.”30 
The sovereignty-based criticisms of the existing Indian family 
doctrine suggest that the doctrine undermines the authority of tribes to 
 
20. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In 
re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 551 (Kan. 2009). 
21. See In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d at 551. 
22. See S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990). 
23. See Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996). 
24. See J.Q. v. D.R.L., 525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind. 1988). 
25. See Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 337 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
26. See In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608-9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
27. See Dawn v. Nev. State Div. of Child & Family Servs., 221 P.3d 1255, 1264 
(Nev. 2009). 
28. See In re K.L.D.R., No. M2008-00897-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 1138130, at *5 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2009). 
29. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 19, at 589-90; Davis, supra note 19, at 471-72; 
Lorie M. Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes:” A Contextual Critique of the Existing 
Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1998); Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, 
One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the “Existing Indian Family” Exception 
(Re)Imposes Anglo American Legal Values on American Indian Tribes to the Detriment 
of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329 (2009); Wendy Therese Parnell, 
Comment, The Existing Indian Family Exception: Denying Tribal Rights Protected by the 
Indian Child Welfare Act, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 381 (1997). 
30. Atwood, supra note 19, at 634 (emphasis added). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/1
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determine their own membership pursuant to their statutory authority in 
the field. Opponents attacking the doctrine on this front, such as 
Professor Atwood, argue that such a usurpation of power by state courts 
is an affront to tribal authority in contravention of congressional intent: 
 
The primary objection to the doctrine is that it disregards 
the interests of the tribe under the ICWA and denies to 
tribes the sovereign right to determine membership. . 
..The right of Indian tribes to maintain a relationship 
with children eligible for membership was a central 
concern of Congress in enacting the ICWA, and the 
existing Indian family exception thwarts that interest. 
Thus, in the view of the courts that have rejected the 
doctrine, the existing Indian family exception directly 
conflicts with the idea of tribal sovereignty and the goal 
of strengthening tribal relations.
 
Further, in allowing 
state courts to assess the sufficiency of an individual’s 
ties with his or her Indian heritage, the doctrine invites 
precisely the kind of state court interference and 
paternalism that the ICWA was intended to eliminate.
31
 
 
Similarly, Professor Davis stresses the contravention of congressional 
policy inherent in judicial adoption of the doctrine: 
 
[I]t is clear that Congress was concerned about the rights 
of Indian children, Indian families, and Indian 
communities vis-a-vis states and their courts: “More 
specifically, its purpose was, in part, to make clear that 
in certain situations the state courts did not have 
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings.” Contrary to 
this purpose, the existing Indian family exception has 
been used to evade applicability of the Act and to 
confine a variety of cases concerning Indian children, 
their families, and tribes in the state courts under state 
law.
32
 
 
31. Id. at 632-33 (footnote omitted); see also Parnell, supra note 29, at 420 (“Courts 
adopting the exception fail or refuse to recognize the tribal interests Congress intended to 
protect in enacting the ICWA.”). 
32. Davis, supra note 19, at 495 (footnote omitted) (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw 
Indians v. Holyfield, 400 U.S. 30, 45 (1989); see also Graham, supra note 29, at 36 
9
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Professor Painter-Thorne goes so far as to suggest that state courts 
applying the doctrine are perpetuating the wrongs that the ICWA was 
designed to correct and prevent: 
 
[W]hen state courts use the exiting Indian family 
exception to avoid ICWA, they perpetuate the very 
injustice ICWA sought to remedy by permitting 
nontribal members to determine the boundaries of Indian 
families. Such efforts may pressure tribal courts to 
conform to an outsider’s cultural perspective by 
minimizing extended kin roles to fit within the nuclear 
family framework so as to assuage state court concerns. 
Moreover, these decisions have the potential to further 
alter Indian kinship structures. . .so that it even more 
closely resembles the Anglo-American model, not as a 
consequence of cultural choice, but as a means to avoid 
state usurpation of tribal jurisdiction.
33
 
 
The textual objection to the existing Indian family doctrine accuses 
state courts of ignoring the plain meaning of the text of the ICWA in 
order to maintain state court jurisdiction over Indian child custody cases. 
For instance, Professor Metteer argues that “instead of relying on the 
Act’s own definitions of ‘Indian child’ and Indian ‘tribal member,’ the 
courts have devised a ‘second litmus test’ to manipulate the application 
and implementation of the Act by variously defining their own criteria 
for ‘Indian-ness.’”34 Professor Davis also highlighted the argument that 
courts applying the doctrine are departing from the text of the ICWA: 
 
When there is no “existing Indian family” from which an 
Indian child is being removed, proponents of the 
exception argue, the ICWA is inapplicable. This 
 
(“Every Indian nation has its own membership or citizenship criteria which may be 
determined by ‘written law, custom, intertribal agreement, or treaty with the United 
States.’ The Existing Indian Family Doctrine, which allows state courts and agencies to 
substitute their views of what ‘belonging’ to a tribal family means for that of the tribe's 
views, thwarts this essential function of tribal sovereignty.” (footnote omitted)). 
33. Painter-Thorne, supra note 29, at 380. 
34. Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419, 429 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/1
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argument is made despite the fact that the two threshold 
requirements for applicability of the ICWA—1) that the 
matter involves an Indian child, and 2) in a child custody 
proceeding—are fulfilled, and despite the fact that there 
is no language in the Act which indicates removal from 
an Indian family as a requirement.
35
 
 
Professor Painter-Thorne also echoes these textual objections by arguing 
that “state courts [that apply the doctrine] are imposing a requirement for 
ICWA application that goes beyond the Act’s plain-language 
requirements.”36 
These are but a representative sampling of the main objections to 
the existing Indian family doctrine. While a determination about the 
merits of these objections is beyond the scope of this Article, an 
understanding of the doctrine and the principal arguments against it is 
necessary to fully appreciate the issues presented by the ICWA, its 
application, and the route taken by the Court in Adoptive Couple. 
 
 
B. The Rights of Putative Fathers 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the rights of putative 
fathers and focuses on the steps necessary for putative fathers to gain and 
protect their parental rights. These steps almost always exceed those 
required of married fathers and unwed mothers. Additionally, the 
determination of the requirements placed on putative fathers seeking to 
affirm their parental rights is almost entirely the province of the several 
states. Given Biological Father’s status as a putative father and the 
prominence of the question of what steps he was required to take in order 
to qualify as a “parent” under the ICWA, this Part is crucial to 
appreciating fully the range of issues at play in Adoptive Couple (despite 
the Court’s decision to brush aside this crucial threshold issue in 
 
35. Davis, supra note 19, at 476; see also Graham, supra note 29, at 35 (“Courts 
and advocates alike have maintained that the Doctrine violates the plain meaning of the 
ICWA, which states that the law will apply to "custody proceedings" involving "Indian 
children" who are either a member of their tribe or eligible for membership. There is no 
statutory requirement that the child or parent meet any additional test of "Indian-ness" 
beyond membership.”). 
36. Painter-Thorne, supra note 29, at 376 (emphasis added). 
11
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Adoptive Couple).
37
 Subsection 1 examines the ICWA’s relevant 
provisions and scholarly commentary, while Subsection 2 delves into the 
Court’s broader putative father doctrine. 
 
1. ICWA 
 
Despite the ICWA’s inclusion of a definition of “parent” in its 
express terms, some states have diverged in their approaches for 
determining the parental status of fathers under the ICWA. Recall that 
the ICWA excludes from its definition of parents “the unwed father 
where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.”38 It is this 
exclusion that has caused confusion for some state courts about whether 
the ICWA incorporates a State’s definition of parenthood for unwed 
biological fathers (or, for purposes of this Article, putative fathers
39
), 
particularly because the ICWA is silent with respect to the steps putative 
fathers are required to take in order to “acknowledge” or “establish” their 
paternity. 
Five states have held that a determination of parental rights for 
putative fathers under the ICWA requires a determination under state 
paternity laws. Those states—California,40 Missouri,41 New Jersey,42 
Oklahoma,
43
 and Texas
44—include three of the four states with the 
largest Indian populations in the United States, according to the 2010 
Census.
45
 On the other hand, Alaska,
46
 Arizona (the state with the third 
 
37. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013). 
38. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012). 
39. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 683 (9th ed. 2009) (defining putative father as 
“[t]he alleged biological father of a child born out of wedlock”). 
40. See In re Daniel M. v. Richard S., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 897, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“Moreover, because the ICWA does not provide a standard for the acknowledgment or 
establishment of paternity, courts have resolved the issue under state law.”). 
41. See In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 607 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting 
that state law controls any paternity determination in a case under the ICWA). 
42. See In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1988) 
(“In light of . . . the failure of either the Act or its interpretive regulations to prescribe or 
define a particular method of acknowledging or establishing paternity, we infer a 
legislative intent to have the acknowledgment or establishment of paternity determined 
by state law.”). 
43. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985), 
overruled on other grounds by In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099, 1101 (Okla. 2004). 
44. See Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 173 (Tex. App. 1995) 
(“Congress intended to have the issue of acknowledgment or establishment of paternity 
determined by state law.”). 
45. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/1
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largest Indian population
47
),
48
 and South Carolina
49
 do not look to their 
state laws when determining whether paternity has been “acknowledged” 
or “established” under the ICWA. 
There has been silence in the academic discourse surrounding this 
disagreement among the states about how to define paternity under the 
ICWA. Regardless, this split affects a large portion of the Nation’s 
Indian population and has muddied the waters for putative Indian fathers 
affected by, for instance, termination or adoption proceedings. The 
Court’s putative fathers jurisprudence will contribute to this Article’s 
critical analysis in Part IV of the Court’s decision. 
 
2. United States Supreme Court Doctrine 
 
Putative fathers—one who is “[t]he alleged biological father of a 
child born out of wedlock”50—have historically had fewer rights than 
both married fathers and unwed mothers. In the last few decades, 
however, putative fathers who have established relationships with their 
children have increasingly convinced the Court of the fundamental 
nature of their parental rights. The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services has described the Court’s approach to the rights of 
putative fathers quite well: 
 
In a series of cases involving unmarried fathers, the U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional protection of 
such a father’s parental rights when he has established a 
substantial relationship with his child. The court found 
 
POPULATION: 2010, at 7 tbl.2 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf [hereinafter CENSUS 
BUREAU]. 
46. See Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 979 (Alaska 2011) (“[E]ven though Bruce 
did not comply with the Alaska legitimation statute requiring signatures from both 
parents or complete his legitimization efforts in court within the first year of Timothy's 
life, he sufficiently acknowledged paternity of Timothy to invoke the application of 
ICWA.”) (footnote omitted). 
47. See CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 45, at tbl.2. 
48. See Michael J., Jr. v. Michael J., Sr., 7 P.3d 960, 963 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that compliance with state law paternity requirements “are not required” under 
the ICWA). 
49. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 560 (S.C. 2012), vacated, 
133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013), remanded to 746 S.E.2d 346 (S.C. 2013); see also infra Part II.B, 
discussing South Carolina state proceedings. 
50. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 39, at 683. 
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that the existence of a biological link between a child 
and an unmarried father gives the father the opportunity 
to establish a substantial relationship, which it defined as 
the father’s commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood, as demonstrated by being involved or 
attempting to be involved in the child’s upbringing. 
Nevertheless, States have almost complete discretion to 
determine the rights of unmarried fathers whose legal 
relationship to a child has not been established for the 
purposes of termination of parental rights or adoption 
proceedings.
51
 
 
The most important inquiry for courts considering the rights of putative 
fathers, then, is whether the father has established a substantial 
relationship with the child. Thus, “unwed fathers have an inchoate 
interest in their children which they can transform into a constitutionally 
protected interest only if they assume substantial parental 
responsibilities.”52 To that end, states are compelled by the Federal 
Social Security Act to have procedures for putative fathers to 
acknowledge paternity.
53
 
This putative father doctrine is the result of a series of Supreme 
Court decisions, beginning with Stanley v. Illinois
54
 in 1972. In Stanley, 
the Court held that Illinois could not remove children, who had lived 
with their father over a period of several years,
55
 from the custody of a 
putative father after the death of the child’s mother “without a hearing on 
parental fitness and without proof of neglect.”56 Next, in Quilloin v. 
 
51. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED FATHERS 2 (2010) available at 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/putative.pdf [hereinafter 
CHILD WELFARE INFO] (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
52. Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1056-57 (2002). 
53. See CHILD WELFARE INFO., supra note 51 at 3 n.5 (“The Federal Social Security 
Act requires States to have in place procedures for mothers and putative fathers to 
acknowledge paternity of a child, including a hospital-based program for the voluntary 
acknowledgment of paternity that focuses on the period immediately before or after the 
birth of the child. The procedures must include that, before they can sign an affidavit of 
paternity, the mother and putative father will be given notice of the alternatives and legal 
consequences that arise from signing the acknowledgment.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
666(a)(5) (2012). 
54. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
55. Id. at 650 n.4. 
56. Id. at 658. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/1
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Walcott,
57
 while the Court recognized “that the relationship between 
parent and child is constitutionally protected,”58 the Court ultimately held 
that Georgia’s application of a “best interests of the child”59 standard in 
adoption proceedings did not violate the rights of a putative father who 
had “never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus . . . 
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily 
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.”60 
Then, in Caban v. Mohammed,
61
 the Court struck down a New York 
law providing that only a mother’s consent, and not a putative father’s, 
was required in adoption proceedings over children born out of 
wedlock.
62
 The Caban Court noted that the putative father in the case had 
“established a substantial relationship with the child and . . . admitted his 
paternity,”63 but the Court also noted that New York would be free to 
eradicate a putative father’s veto over adoption if the father had “never. . 
.come forward to participate in the rearing of his child.”64 And in Lehr v. 
Robertson,
65
 the Court held that New York was not constitutionally 
required to give notice of adoption to a putative father who “never 
established any custodial, personal, or financial relationship with”66 the 
child, thereby failing to establish a substantial relationship,
67
 and who 
failed to file with New York’s putative father registry.68 
Central to the Court’s jurisprudence on putative fathers is the idea 
that the biological link between putative father and child only provides 
the father with an opportunity to have a role in the child’s life. More is 
required of a father if he is to gain the protection of the Constitution. As 
the Court noted in Lehr: 
 
57. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
58. Id. at 255. 
59. Id. at 251. 
60. Id. at 256. 
61. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
62. Id. at 392. 
63. Id. at 393. 
64. Id. at 392. 
65. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
66. Id. at 267-68. 
67. Id. at 266-68. 
68. See id. at 263-65. The Court’s other major putative fatherhood case is Michael 
H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110, 130-32 (1989) (examining the liberty interest of the child 
in maintaining her filial relationship and finding that a California law creating a 
presumption of paternity for the man married to and cohabitating with the mother of the 
child could block a biological father attempting to assert his own paternity and establish a 
relationship with the child). 
15
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The significance of the biological connection is that it 
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other 
male possesses to develop a relationship with his 
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some 
measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may 
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and 
make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s 
development. If he fails to do so, the Federal 
Constitution will not automatically compel a state to 
listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests 
lie.
69
 
 
Similarly, June Carbone succinctly synthesized the Court’s putative 
father doctrine by noting that the Lehr decision, authored by Justice 
Stevens, “united the Supreme Court’s conflicting decisions on 
fatherhood by taking the existence of a paternal relationship as a given. If 
a father’s relationship with his children is a substantial one, that 
relationship merits constitutional protection. If not, the inquiry ends 
there.”70 The doctrine has, as well, spawned a significant amount of 
scholarly attention.
71
 
This thinking—that the mere act of fathering a child, without more 
subsequent involvement, provides only an opportunity for the putative 
father to have a role in the interests of the child—is unsurprisingly 
reflected in the ICWA’s exclusion from its definition of parent “the 
unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or 
established.”72 Thus, the Court’s putative father doctrine, at a minimum, 
provides a gloss on the proper understanding the ICWA and its 
application in Adoptive Couple. 
 
 
 
69. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (footnote omitted). 
70. June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creating a New Model 
of Parental Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1091, 1101 (1999). 
71. See, e.g., June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the 
Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1322-28 (2005); Marsha Garrison, Law 
Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal 
Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 885-89 (2000); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking 
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of 
the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 919-27 (1984). 
72. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012). 
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II. The Court’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Race, Family 
Law, & Indian Tribes 
 
Before turning to the rich factual story and nuanced legal issues of 
Adoptive Couple, a discussion of the Equal Protection Clause and its 
impact on race as a factor in adoption is appropriate in order to 
understand the full gravity of the constitutional issues at play. This Part 
provides an overview and survey of the Court’s Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence insofar as it is relevant to the consideration of race and 
tribal status in the context of adoption. First, Section A explores race as a 
factor in adoption, focusing on the approaches of the Court and Congress 
with respect to race in adoption. Section B then turns to the Court’s much 
more deferential approach to laws aimed at Indian tribes when 
considered through the lens of equal protection. Section B also discusses 
a sampling of the leading, albeit limited, scholarly discussion of the 
ICWA and its Equal Protection Clause implications.
73
 This Part presents 
a picture of the ICWA as a doctrinal anomaly that stands alone, in certain 
applications, as a naked racial classification and preference in the 
otherwise colorblind world of adoption. Part III’s discussion of the facts 
and legal issues at play in Adoptive Couple will set the stage for Part IV’s 
critical analysis of the Adoptive Couple Court’s failure both to subject 
the ICWA to strict scrutiny and ultimately strike it down, as-applied, as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
A. The Intersection of Race and Adoption 
 
The Court first entertained the idea of subjecting laws that draw 
racial distinctions to a strict level of scrutiny in the famous footnote four 
of Carolene Products. Justice Stone suggested that a higher level of 
scrutiny might be appropriate in cases dealing with minority groups: 
“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which 
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”74 
 
73. For example, in a forthcoming article about colorblindness in family law, Katie 
Eyer omits full discussion of the ICWA beyond cursory mention of what the Court might 
do in Adoptive Couple. See Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 4 n.9, 50-53), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185728. 
74. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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Eventually, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, formally 
embraced the strict scrutiny standard of review for racial classifications 
in the notorious Korematsu v. United States decision: “[A]ll legal 
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are 
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most 
rigid scrutiny.”75 
A complete survey and analysis of the subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions that have come to shape and refine the Court’s approach to 
judicial review of racial classifications under the Equal Protection Clause 
are beyond the scope of this Article. There is a plethora of scholarship 
debating the Court’s doctrinal embrace of colorblindness,76 and the 
Roberts Court’s recent opinion in Fisher is the most recent example of 
the Court’s seeming distaste for racial classifications of any kind.77 
Despite this, a brief discussion of the Court’s handling of race as a factor 
in adoption proceedings is appropriate to highlight briefly colorblindness 
in the specific context of adoption. 
The judiciary’s disdain for the consideration of race in adoption, 
custody, and foster placements has been more nuanced and ambivalent 
than Congress’s 1996 decision, discussed infra. For instance, Andrew 
Morrison noted the inconsistent approaches of courts dealing with the 
question of the permissibility of race as a factor in adoption cases: 
 
The cases addressing the constitutionality of using race 
in the adoption process are not entirely consistent. 
However, the courts have generally held “race should be 
considered, but may not be a controlling factor in 
determining the best interest of the child.” The majority 
of cases that address constitutional challenges to the use 
of race in adoption apply strict scrutiny analysis.
78
 
 
75. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (emphasis added). 
76. See, e.g., ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992); Christopher 
W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (2008); 
David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99 (1986); Laurence 
H. Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color-Blind?, 20 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 201 (1986); Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get 
Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race.”, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147 (1979); 
Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment 
of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1974) . 
77. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
78. Andrew Morrison, Transracial Adoption: The Pros and Cons of the Parents’ 
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Despite this seeming inconsistency, the Supreme Court held in 1984 that 
consideration of race in a child custody dispute violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution.
79
 In Palmore, the Court considered 
a state court’s decision to remove a child from the custody of his mother 
solely because the mother was in an interracial marriage.
80
 Applying 
strict scrutiny analysis, the Court found that “the reality of private 
[racial] biases and the possible injury they might inflict” were 
impermissible considerations in a custody dispute and that such a racial 
classification ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.
81
 Thus, the Court 
noted that while “[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices . . . 
neither can it tolerate them.”82 Palmore is by far the Court’s most direct 
decision on the issue of race as a factor in adoption and placement 
proceedings, and the obvious reading of the case leads to the conclusion 
that colorblindness in custody disputes is consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause, if not constitutionally mandated. 
Similarly, on the legislative side of things, Congress has expressed 
clearly its distaste for consideration of race as a factor in adoption. From 
at least 1996 onward, the policy of the United States has been to bar, in 
almost all circumstances, consideration of race as a factor in adoption 
proceedings. Congress legislated to this end via a 1996 amendment to the 
Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) of 1994, which applies to any child 
welfare agency receiving federal funds.
83
 According to John Myers, 
“[o]nly in narrow circumstances, where the needs of a specific child 
make race important, can social workers consider race as a factor.”84 The 
Harvard Law Review’s analysis of the MEPA amendments captured the 
unequivocal decision of Congress to remove race as a factor in adoptions 
and other types of placements: 
 
With bipartisan support, little public opposition, and 
 
Perspective, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 167, 175 (2004) (quoting Rita J. Simon & 
Howard Alstein, The Relevance of Race in Adoption Law and Social Practice, 11 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 171, 175 (1997)). 
79. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984). 
80. See id. at 430-31. 
81. Id. at 433. 
82. Id. 
83. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808, 
110 Stat. 1755 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
84. JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
102 (2006). 
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minimal fanfare, the 104th Congress moved to end the 
longstanding practice of matching adoptive parents and 
children according to race. Repealing a previous federal 
statute that explicitly allowed consideration of race as a 
factor in placement determinations, the Small Business 
Jobs Protection Act (SBJPA) makes clear that adoption 
agencies can no longer use race to delay or deny 
adoptive placement.
85
 
 
More specifically, no State or associated entities that receive federal 
funds and are involved in adoption or foster care placements may “deny 
to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or foster parent, on 
the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the person, or of the 
child, involved.”86 Such recipients of federal funds also may not “delay 
or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on the 
basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, 
or the child, involved.”87 The 1996 amendment to MEPA inserted these 
exact same prohibitions against the consideration of race in adoption and 
foster care placement in 42 U.S.C. § 1996b, but the prohibitions in this 
section apply more broadly to any “person or government that is 
involved in adoption or foster care placements.”88 Unsurprisingly, 
Congress’s 1996 amendments explicitly exempted the ICWA from the 
prohibitions against the consideration of race, further cementing the 
ICWA’s unique position as an outlier in an otherwise colorblind world of 
adoption law.
89
 
 
B. Laws Implicating Indian Tribes 
 
Indian tribes have long held an uncertain and uncomfortable 
position in the legal landscape of the United States throughout its history, 
prompting serious debate about what sovereignty truly means for tribes. 
In this sense, the quasi-sovereignty of tribes places them in a unique 
 
85. Recent Legislation, Transracial Adoption—Congress Forbids Use of Race As a 
Factor in Adoptive Placement Decisions—Small Business Jobs Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 104-188, S 1808 (1996), 110 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1352 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 671(18)(A) (2012). 
87. Id. § 671(18)(B). 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1) (2012). 
89. Id. §1996b(3) (“This subsection shall not be construed to affect the application 
of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.”). 
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position constitutionally speaking. The tension between this notion of 
tribal sovereignty and the ancestral and racial heritage of tribal members 
raises the most serious equal protection concerns. In trying to resolve this 
tension, the Supreme Court has come down largely on the side of tribal 
sovereignty, subjecting laws that confer benefits on tribes or subject 
them to preferential treatment to a low, rational basis, level of scrutiny. 
This section will first examine the Court’s approach to equal protection 
challenges to laws implicating Indian tribes and discuss some of the 
scholarly discussion surrounding the Court’s jurisdiction. Next, this 
section will briefly point to the lack of interest by the Court and 
academia in the ICWA’s equal protection flaws. 
 
1. Sovereigns, a Racial Group, or Both? 
 
Prior to Adoptive Couple, the Supreme Court made clear that 
“classifications based on Indian tribal membership are not impermissible 
racial classification.”90 The Court based this conclusion on the concept of 
tribal sovereignty, whereby classifications affecting tribal members were 
deemed to be firmly non-racial ones.
91
 This doctrinal move allowed the 
Court to avoid a more critical examination of such laws that would have 
otherwise demanded strict scrutiny because of their racially divisive 
nature. 
The Court’s pivotal decision on this racial-sovereign dichotomy 
came in 1974 in Morton v. Mancari.
92
 The Morton Court was faced with 
a challenge to a law that provided employment preferences to Indians 
within the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
93
 With respect to the equal 
protection issues posed by the preferences, the Court explicitly declined 
to characterize classifications of Indians as racial and instead keyed in on 
the enhancement of tribal self-government: “Contrary to the 
characterization made by appellees, this preference does not constitute 
‘racial discrimination.’ Indeed, it is not even a ‘racial’ preference. 
Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the 
cause of Indian self-government . . . .”94 Further, the Court also found 
 
90. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2584 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1977); Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974)). 
91. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2584. 
92. Morton, 417 U.S. 535. 
93. Id. at 537-41. 
94. Id. at 553-54 (footnote omitted). 
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that “[t]he preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete 
racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities 
whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique 
fashion.”95 Lest there be any doubt regarding the appropriate level of 
judicial review applicable to Indian classifications, the Court 
unequivocally announced that rational basis would apply: “As long as the 
special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ 
unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not 
be disturbed.”96 Neil Jessup Newton characterized this deferential 
approach as permitting almost any kind of legislative action: 
 
Because the judiciary has defined congressional 
authority over Indians so broadly, application of this 
deferential standard of review to Indian legislation 
permits almost any conceivable legislative action. In 
short, if the permissible statutory purpose is to manage 
Indian affairs, any legislation affecting Indians, almost 
by definition, would be rationally related to that 
purpose.
97
 
 
While later noting that the law is “settled that ‘the unique legal 
status of Indian tribes under federal law’ permits the Federal Government 
to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might 
otherwise be constitutionally offensive,” the Court again stressed that 
tribal classifications were permissible.
98
 However, David Williams has 
argued that the Court might have implicitly drawn a distinction between 
the racial and tribal usages of the term Indian: 
 
The Supreme Court, moreover, did not intend to argue 
that “Indian” can never be a racial term. Rather, the 
Court carefully distinguished between two usages of the 
 
95. Id. at 554. 
96. Id. at 555. 
97. Neil Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and 
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 242 (1984) (emphasis added). 
98. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 
U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979) (quoting Mortin v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974)); see 
also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-49 (1977) (reaffirming Mancari’s 
deferential approach toward federal laws with respect to tribes, rejecting equal protection 
challenges to such legislative efforts, and dismissing attempts to characterize laws 
affecting tribes as impermissible racial classifications). 
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term—racial and political. Mancari, for example, 
opposed a “‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians”‘ to a 
category that includes only “members of ‘federally 
recognized’ tribes” and excludes “many individuals who 
are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’” It is therefore 
possible, in the Court’s mind, to think of Indians in a 
racial light and so use the category with a racial 
meaning. Apparently, however, the racial usage is 
confined to the general category “Indian,” meaning all 
Indians; one cannot use the category “enrolled members 
of the Navajo Nation” in a racial sense. As long as the 
government confines itself to “legislation singling out 
tribal Indians,” it is on safe ground.99 
 
This racial-tribal distinction, according to the Court, might have 
profound constitutional significance, but Williams persuasively argues 
that one cannot divorce the racial component of “Indian” from its tribal 
one: 
 
Virtually all of the federal definitions of “Indian” 
contain, to the naked eye, a substantial genetic and 
therefore racial component. In Mancari, for example, the 
BIA regulations required that to be eligible for the 
preference, “an individual must be one-fourth or more 
degree Indian blood and be a member of a federally 
recognized tribe.” At most, this definition contains one 
political element—membership in a federally-recognized 
tribe. But the preference also has a second and openly 
genetic requirement that has nothing to do with politics. 
If one were a member of a recognized tribe but had less 
than one-fourth Indian blood, then one would not qualify 
for the preference strictly because one did not have 
enough Indian genetic material. Tying legal benefits to 
this kind of racial calibration has historically been 
associated with racism at its most despicable; consider 
the distinctions in this country between “octoroons” and 
“mulattos,” and in South Africa between “blacks” and 
 
99. David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians As 
Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 793-94 (1991) (footnotes omitted). 
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“coloreds.” It should make us nervous; it should not be 
shrugged off with the blithe assertion that it is all 
political. In most federal definitions, then, the category 
“Indian” is both political and racial. The simple fact that 
race is one element may not close the analysis; one 
might still argue that, by combining the two factors, the 
government can somehow remove the constitutional 
taint from the racial factor. But to retain any honesty, the 
Court must acknowledge that the classification is 
partially racial.
100
 
 
Williams’ position is a strong one: any classification based on tribal 
status inherently relies on a racial one, as well, because membership in 
Indian tribes is linked to a person’s racial heritage. Williams is not alone 
in identifying this problematic element of the Court’s approach.101 Carole 
Goldberg, however, takes a more critical view of attempts to characterize 
tribal classifications—what she calls “racialization”—as racial ones in 
order to trigger strict scrutiny: 
 
While the U.S. Supreme Court historically used 
racialization to establish Indians’ inferiority and to 
justify dominant society controls, today’s courts, I 
contend, use racialization to trigger strict scrutiny under 
equal protection law and thereby to deny Indians the 
benefit of federal measures enacted to compensate for or 
reverse prior harms. The courts allow Indians to escape 
this result only by proving up their identity in cultural 
terms that satisfy non-Indians’ criteria for “Indianness.” 
If the Indians cannot do so, the courts deny them legal 
rights otherwise available to them as tribal members and 
Indians, thereby challenging their identities as well. 
Some legal scholars are joining this misguided call for 
cultural tests establishing Indian identity and entitlement 
to special federal legislation.
102
 
 
100. Id. at 794-95 (footnotes omitted). 
101. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special 
Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996). But see, e.g., 
Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, Not “Strictly” Racial: A Response to “Indians as 
Peoples,” 39 UCLA L. REV. 169 (1991). 
102. Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2002) 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/1
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While Goldberg concedes that tribal citizenship is largely dependent on 
“the circumstances of one’s birth,” she nonetheless argues that “this leap 
from the fact of descent-based tribal citizenship into legal doctrines of 
race is both regrettable and unnecessary, given the alternative that both 
positive law and constitutional interpretation permit.”103 Under 
Goldberg’s view, both the Constitution and political theory lend support 
to “treating Indian classifications outside the conventional framework of 
race, so long as those classifications are directed toward fulfillment of 
unique obligations that the federal government owes to tribes.”104 
Regardless of one’s view about the extent of the role that race plays 
in determining a person’s status as a tribal member, it is undeniable that 
racial heritage plays, at a minimum, some role. This uncomfortable 
reality—that a tribal member’s racial heritage is an element of tribal 
identity that cannot be ignored—is of immense import when considering 
the Court’s attempt to ignore the racial element of tribal classifications. 
The requirements for membership in a modern Indian tribe illustrate the 
inherently racial nature of membership. For example, the Cherokee 
Nation purports to “not require a specific blood quorum” as a condition 
for citizenship.
105
 However, the Nation links citizenship to an applicant’s 
ability to identify a direct blood connection to a group of recognized 
tribal members: 
 
To be eligible for a federal Certificate Degree of Indian 
Blood and Cherokee Nation tribal citizenship, you must 
 
(footnote omitted). 
103. Id. at 1376. 
104. Id. at 1375; see also Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and 
Federal Indian Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1165, 1196 (2010) (“Today, measures seeking to 
restore indigenous peoples to meaningful self-governance and economic health are 
challenged as violating prohibitions on equal protection. But the history, purpose, and 
context of equal protection and federal Indian policy reveal that special federal treatment 
of Indians and tribes is consistent with equal protection and in service of its basic goals. 
While an anti-racial discrimination norm is at the core of equal protection, racial 
discrimination for Indian peoples had less to do with defining individuals according to 
race than with defining tribes as racial groups and denying them sovereignty and property 
as a result. Policies that seek to fulfill promises made to tribal governments, rebuild tribal 
lands, or restore tribes as political agents with the ability to provide for their people 
mitigate the effects of this state-sanctioned racial discrimination. These measures do not 
violate equal protection; they further it.”). 
105. CHEROKEE NATION, About Citizenship, 
http://www.cherokee.org/Services/TribalCitizenship/Citizenship.aspx (last visited April 
24, 2014). 
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be able to provide documents that connect you to a direct 
ancestor listed on the Dawes Final Rolls of Citizens of 
the Cherokee Nation with a blood degree. This roll was 
taken between 1899-1906 of Citizens and Freedmen 
residing in Indian Territory (now northeastern 
Oklahoma) prior to Oklahoma statehood in 1907.
106
 
 
Further, this connection can only “be proven through the biological 
parent to the enrolled ancestor.”107 Even the federal government’s 
Bureau of Indian Affairs requires direct, biological connection to 
previously recognized rolls of tribal members: “You must show your 
relationship to an enrolled member(s) of a federally recognized Indian 
tribe, whether it is through your birth mother or birth father, or both.”108 
Notwithstanding the compelling arguments that any legislative 
classification implicating Indian tribal members inherently involves a 
racial classification, the Court’s doctrine makes clear that legislative 
action affecting tribes need only pass the deferential rational basis level 
of scrutiny. Accordingly, equal protection challenges to such federal 
laws have routinely failed. Or, more accurately, courts have declined to 
entertain the challenges, instead invoking the Mancari Court’s 
application of rational basis as settled law. Adoptive Couple, 
unfortunately, did nothing to alter the Court’s doctrinal position. 
2. The ICWA and Equal Protection 
 
In light of the ICWA’s substantive provisions that apply exclusively 
to Indian children,
109
 one would expect ICWA itself to have prompted 
both a healthy amount of constitutional challenges in court and scholarly 
criticism on equal protection grounds. However, the Court has largely 
ignored ICWA’s inherent equal protection uncertainty, and academia has 
not devoted much attention to this issue either. 
Until Adoptive Couple, the Court had only taken up a challenge to 
ICWA in one case, which did not include any substantive equal 
 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, CERTIFICATE OF DEGREE OF INDIAN OR ALASKA 
NATIVE BLOOD INSTRUCTIONS, (Oct. 31, 2014), 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc002653.pdf. 
109. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012) (defining “Indian Child” as “any 
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe 
or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a 
member of an Indian tribe”). 
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protection discussion. That decision, Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians v. Holyfield, addressed only the meaning of “domicile” for 
purposes one of ICWA’s provision, section 1911(a),110 which extends 
exclusive jurisdiction to tribes over some custody proceedings.
111
 The 
lower courts have largely avoided the equal protection problems with 
ICWA, instead invoking, for instance, the “existing Indian family 
doctrine” in order to avoid ICWA’s constitutional difficulties. Part I.A.2, 
supra, examined this controversial doctrine in greater depth.
112
 As Part 
IV’s assessment of the decision in Adoptive Couple will more fully 
illustrate, even the Adoptive Couple Court was not immune to asserting 
the canon of constitutional avoidance in order to avoid tackling head-on 
ICWA’s equal protection difficulty. 
One of the rare notable lower federal court decisions to address 
directly the racial nature of tribal classifications, Williams v. Babbitt in 
the Ninth Circuit,
113
 did not concern ICWA. Rather, the Ninth Circuit 
addressed an equal protection challenge to an administrative 
interpretation of the Reindeer Industry Act that prohibited reindeer 
herding by non-natives in Alaska.
114
 Unsurprisingly, the court invoked 
the canon of constitutional avoidance, thereby striking down the 
agency’s constitutionally troubling interpretation of the Reindeer 
Industry Act, in order to sidestep the equal protection problems posed by 
such a naked racial preference.
115
 
A full discussion of ICWA’s equal protection flaws has been 
lacking in scholarship, as well. The bulk of ICWA’s scholarly treatment 
has been devoted to the question of whether the judicially crafted 
“existing Indian family doctrine” is meritorious.116 John Robert Renner’s 
 
110. § 1911(a) (“An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State 
over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled 
within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in 
the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the 
Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile 
of the child.”). 
111. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48-53 (1989). 
112. See supra Part I.A.2. 
113. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997). 
114. Id. at 659. 
115. Id. at 666 (“The constitutional questions raised by the IBIA's interpretation are 
grave and, as intervenors and amici point out, implicate an entire title of the United States 
Code. We see no reason to unnecessarily resolve them when a less constitutionally 
troubling construction is readily available. We therefore interpret the Reindeer Act as not 
precluding non-natives in Alaska from owning and importing reindeer.”). 
116. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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work might come closest to touching on the specific issues raised by this 
Article—ICWA’s inherent equal protection difficulty stemming from the 
law’s race-based preferences—but his article is over twenty years old 
and largely limits its scope to criticizing proposed amendments to ICWA 
offered in the 100
th
 Congress.
117
 Carole Goldberg’s work, which comes 
down on the other side of the equal protection debate, is a notable 
exception.
118
 In one particularly relevant article, she examined ICWA, 
along with the Reindeer Industry Act, in order to highlight and criticize 
the growing “reconceptualiz[ation of] Indian identity as a racial 
identity.”119 However, she relies almost exclusively on a discussion and 
analysis of the approach of the California courts as evidence of this racial 
“reconceptualization” in the context of ICWA.120 Her reliance on the 
doctrinal approach of the intermediate court of one state hardly 
constitutes a broader judicial trend, and is susceptible to criticism as a 
straw man erected to further her broader goals to criticize 
characterization of ICWA and other federal laws as racial classifications. 
 
III. The Saga of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 
 
This Part provides a detailed overview of the heart-wrenching tale 
of Adoptive Couple. Section A begins with an overview of the factual 
background, largely relying on the excellent characterization of the facts 
provided by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Section B then examines 
the procedural history of the case and presents an overview of the 
rationales underlying the decisions of the South Carolina courts to order 
transfer of custody of Baby Girl to Biological Father. This Part concludes 
in Section C with a summary of the arguments made before the United 
States Supreme Court by the Petitioners, Guardian ad Litem, 
Respondents, and the United States as amicus curiae. A thorough and 
critical examination of the Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple is 
reserved for Part V. 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
117. See John Robert Renner, The Indian Child Welfare Act and Equal Protection 
Limitations on the Federal Power over Indian Affairs, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 129, 130-
31, 168-74 (1992). 
118. See Goldberg, Descent into Race, supra note 102, at 1375. 
119. Id. at 1375. 
120. Id. at 1384-88 (discussing In re Santos Y, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1026 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001) and In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). 
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As is typical in child custody cases, the parties were not named in 
the filings and decisions in Adoptive Couple. Thus, this Article uses the 
following names to identify the relevant parties: Baby Girl, Biological 
Father, Biological Mother, and Adoptive Mother/Father/Couple. 
Additionally, this factual overview relies heavily on the South Carolina 
Supreme Court’s Adoptive Couple decision, which provided an extensive 
overview of the pertinent facts.
121
 
Baby Girl was born in Oklahoma, the child of Biological Father and 
Biological Mother, a couple that had once been engaged but never 
married.
122
 Biological Father is a registered member of the Cherokee 
Nation, a Bronze Star recipient and veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
and, at the time of the relevant proceedings, a member of the National 
Guard.
123
 During the course of the pregnancy, Biological Mother broke 
off the couple’s engagement, after which point Biological Father failed 
to “make any meaningful attempts to contact her” or support her 
financially, despite his ability to do so as an active-duty service member 
at the time.
124
 
Eventually, Biological Mother sent a text message to Biological 
Father asking him to relinquish his parental rights; the South Carolina 
Supreme Court described that exchange as follows: 
 
In June 2009, Mother sent a text message to Father 
asking if he would rather pay child support or surrender 
his parental rights. Father responded via text message 
that he would relinquish his rights, but testified that he 
believed he was relinquishing his rights to Mother. 
Father explained: “In my mind I thought that if I would 
do that I’d be able to give her time to think about this 
and possibly maybe we would get back together and 
continue what we had started.” However, under cross-
examination Father admitted that his behavior was not 
conducive to being a father. Mother never informed 
Father that she intended to place the baby up for 
adoption. Father insists that, had he known this, he 
 
121. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552-56 (S.C. 2012), 
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013), remanded to 746 S.E.2d 346 (2013). 
122. Id. at 552-53. 
123. Id. at 553 n.2. 
124. Id. at 553. 
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would have never considered relinquishing his rights.
125
 
 
Other parties to the case painted Biological Father’s response and actions 
in a more negative light. The Petitioners (Adoptive Couple) noted 
Biological Father’s text message renunciation and described Biological 
Father’s state of mind at the time: “Father expected Mother to raise the 
baby by herself, explaining that he did not feel ‘responsible as a father’ 
unless Mother married him.”126 The Guardian ad Litem painted a similar 
picture: “Birth Father sent a return text message stating that he 
surrendered his parental rights . . . . He later testified that he chose to 
relinquish his parental rights over paying child support in an effort ‘to 
give [Birth Mother] time to think about’ whether she should have ended 
their relationship.”127 
Biological Mother ultimately chose the adoption route because of 
her financial struggles, and decided to pick Adoptive Couple, whom she 
met through an adoption agency, because of their stability.
128
 In fact, 
Adoptive Couple, South Carolina residents, “provided financial 
assistance to Mother during the final months of her pregnancy and after 
Baby Girl’s birth.”129 Adoptive Father—an automotive body 
technician—and Adoptive Mother—a doctoral psychologist who works 
with families and children with behavior problems—have been married 
since 2005 and have no other children.
130
 While Biological Mother told 
Adoptive Couple of Baby Girl’s Indian heritage, they were led by 
Biological Mother to believe that Biological Father was not involved.
131
 
Further, Adoptive Couple attempted to verify Biological Father’s tribal 
enrollment with the Cherokee Nation, but because of inaccuracies in a 
letter sent by their attorney to the Cherokee Nation, they were under the 
false impression that Baby Girl was not Cherokee.
132
 
At Biological Mother’s request, Biological Father was not contacted 
 
125. Id. 
126. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) 
(No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597 at *7. 
127. Brief for Guardian ad Litem, as Representative of Baby Girl, Supporting 
Reversal at 15, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 
WL 633603 at *15 (alteration in original). 
128. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 553. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 553-54. 
132. Id. at 554. 
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at all during her stay at the hospital associated with giving birth.
133
 
Adoptive Couple, on the other hand, was present in the delivery room, 
and Adoptive Father cut the umbilical cord.
134
 The next day, Biological 
Mother signed the requisite forms renouncing her parental rights and 
offering her consent to the adoption; however, Adoptive Couple had to 
wait for consent from Oklahoma to move Baby Girl to South Carolina.
135
 
Biological Mother did not identify Baby Girl as “Native American”—she 
identified her as “Hispanic”—on the documentation needed for Adoptive 
Couple to move Baby Girl to South Carolina, but if Biological Mother 
had listed Baby Girl correctly, Adoptive Couple would not have been 
able to remove Baby Girl from Oklahoma (although there is some 
dispute among the parties on this point).
136
 
 
B. South Carolina State Proceedings137 
 
A South Carolina family court first considered Adoptive Couple’s 
adoption petition.
138
 Following Biological Father’s victory in the family 
Court, the South Carolina Supreme Court certified Adoptive Couple’s 
appeal and took up the case.
139
 
 
1. Family Court 
 
Biological Father made no effort to contact Baby Girl or Biological 
Mother following the birth and did not learn of the adoption until almost 
four months later via a process server.
140
 The process server presented 
 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 554-55, 555 & n.8 (“[H]ad ‘Native American’ been circled on the 
[Interstate Compact on Placement of Children] form, the ICPC administrator would have 
contacted . . . [the Cherokee Nation]. Whether or not the Cherokee Nation would have 
ultimately allowed the adoption to go forward is a matter of tribal law. However, the 
testimony establishes the tribe would not have consented to Baby Girl’s removal at that 
time, triggering the denial of [Adoptive Couple’s] ICPC application, and [Adoptive 
Couple] would not have been able to transport Baby Girl to South Carolina.”); but see 
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 126, at 9 (“The adoption consent form identified Baby 
Girl’s ethnicity as ‘Caucasian/Native American Indian/Hispanic.’”). 
137. This Article omits any discussion of the short-lived Oklahoma proceedings 
relevant to the custody struggle over Baby Girl. 
138. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555. 
139. Id. at 556. 
140. Id. at 555. 
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papers associated with Adoptive Couple’s adoption action in South 
Carolina, entitled “Acceptance of Service and Answer of Defendant,” 
that Biological Father signed and purported to waive his ability to contest 
the adoption and other procedural safeguards.
141
 Ultimately, the 
Cherokee Nation intervened in the South Carolina adoption action 
pursuant to the ICWA, arguing that Baby Girl was an Indian Child under 
the ICWA.
142
 Biological Father eventually answered the Adoptive 
Couple’s complaint, “stating [that] he did not consent to the adoption of 
Baby Girl and seeking custody.”143 
After Biological Father conclusively established custody, a 
Guardian ad Litem—who “recommended that the adoption be approved 
in the best interests of the child”144—was appointed, and the family court 
held a hearing, the court made its findings, which resulted in a denial of 
the adoption petition and an order to transfer custody to Biological 
Father: 
 
(1) the ICWA applied and it was not unconstitutional; 
(2) the “Existing Indian Family” doctrine was 
inapplicable as an exception to the application of the 
ICWA in this case in accordance with the clear modern 
trend; (3) Father did not voluntarily consent to the 
termination of his parental rights or the adoption; and (4) 
Appellants failed to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that Father’s parental rights should be 
terminated or that granting custody of Baby Girl to 
Father would likely result in serious emotional or 
physical damage to Baby Girl.
145
 
 
Biological Father did, in fact, receive custody of Baby Girl, and 
they traveled back to Oklahoma.
146
 Adoptive Couple appealed the family 
court’s decision, and the South Carolina Supreme Court certified the 
appeal pursuant to state procedure.
147
 
 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 556. 
144. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 126, at 12. 
145. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
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2. Supreme Court 
 
A divided South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the family 
court’s transfer order. Despite noting that “[u]nder state law, [Biological] 
Father’s consent to the adoption would not have been required,”148 the 
court nonetheless found the ICWA applicable, thus enabling Biological 
Father to block the adoption.
149
 In so holding, the court also explicitly 
rejected the existing Indian family doctrine because “its policy conflicts 
with the express purpose of the ICWA. . . .”150 The court also rejected 
Adoptive Couple’s argument that the ICWA, by virtue of not “explicitly 
set[ting] forth a procedure for an unwed father to acknowledge or 
establish paternity,” defers to state law.151 Instead, seemingly contrary to 
the language of the ICWA, which excludes from its definition of parents 
“the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or 
established,”152 the court held that both establishing paternity via DNA 
testing and pursuing court proceedings to block adoption were “by its 
plain terms . . . all that is required under the ICWA.”153 
The court, having found Biological Father to be a “Parent” under 
the ICWA, found Biological Father’s relinquishment of parental duties 
irrelevant to an analysis couched in the ICWA: “Father’s perceived lack 
of interest in or support for Baby Girl during the pregnancy and first four 
months of her life as a basis for termination his rights as a parent is not a 
valid consideration under the ICWA . . . .”154 In light of the heightened 
federal standards for termination of parental rights over an Indian 
child,
155
 the court affirmed the family court’s order “with a heavy heart” 
despite describing Adoptive Couple as “ideal parents who have exhibited 
the ability to provide a loving family environment for Baby Girl.”156 In 
fact, the court felt constrained by the ICWA’s placement preferences—
which embody a presumption that placement within an Indian home is in 
the child’s best interest—from even engaging in its traditional placement 
preference analysis: “[A]ny attempt to utilize our state’s best interest of 
 
148. Id. at 560 n.19. 
149. Id. at 560. 
150. Id. at 558 n.17. 
151. Id. at 560. 
152. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012). 
153. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 560. 
154. Id. at 564 n.26. 
155. See § 1912(f). 
156. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 567. 
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the child standard to eclipse the ICWA’s statutory preferences ignores 
the fact that the statutory placement preferences [of the ICWA] and the 
Indian child’s best interests are not mutually exclusive 
considerations.”157 
 
C. Parties’ Arguments Before the United States Supreme  
 Court 
 
The two questions presented in the case were: 
 
(1) Whether a non-custodial parent can invoke ICWA 
[the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1901-63,] to block an adoption voluntarily and 
lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent under state law 
[; and (2)] whether ICWA defines “parent” in 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1903(9) to include an unwed biological father who has 
not complied with state law rules to attain legal status as 
a parent.
158
 
 
The sections that follow provide a brief summary of the major arguments 
that the parties made before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
1. Petitioners159 
 
Petitioners made a four-part argument essentially grounded in their 
contention that the ICWA should not have blocked South Carolina courts 
from applying state law to Baby Girl’s adoption proceedings. First, 
Petitioners argued that the ICWA’s definition of “parent” excludes 
unwed fathers without substantive parental rights under relevant state 
law.
160 
More precisely, Petitioners said “[t]he Act does not resuscitate 
parental rights for unwed fathers who under state law repudiated those 
very rights and flouted their parental responsibilities to the pregnant 
mother and child.”161 
 
157. Id. 
158. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 
831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2012 WL 4502948 at *i. 
159. Lisa S. Blatt of Arnold & Porter LLP was Counsel of Record for Adoptive 
Couple, the Petitioners. See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 126. 
160. See id. at *20-29. 
161. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 126, at *20. 
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Second, Petitioners suggested that even if Biological Father met the 
ICWA’s definition of “parent,” he should still be unable to assert the 
ICWA’s substantive protections because he never had custody of Baby 
Girl and the ICWA’s purpose was to protect Indian children from being 
removed from Indian parents, families, and reservations.
162
 Largely 
invoking the existing Indian family doctrine, Petitioners asserted: 
 
Even if the state court correctly interpreted the term 
“parent,” reversal still is required because the court 
further erred in holding that ICWA creates custodial 
rights and creates Indian families anew—i.e., when they 
would not otherwise exist under state or tribal law. 
Specifically, Sections 1912(d) and (f) do not permit a 
noncustodial father to veto the adoptive choices made by 
a non-Indian mother when state law confers on the 
mother sole custodial rights with respect to the Indian 
child.
163
 
 
Third, Petitioners argued that the South Carolina Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the ICWA raised “grave constitutional concerns under 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Tenth 
Amendment,”164 and they suggested that the canon of constitutional 
doubt counseled against such a troublesome interpretation.
165
 
Fourth, Petitioners claimed that application of the ICWA’s Indian 
child placement preferences to a situation where there is no preexisting 
family “would impose a de facto ban on interracial adoptions and punish 
countless abandoned Indian children in need of adoptive homes.”166 
 
2. Guardian ad Litem167 
 
 
162. See id. at *29-43. 
163. Id. at *29. 
164. Id. at *17. 
165. Id. at *43; see also id. at *43-51. 
166. Id. at *19; see also id. at *51-57. 
167. Paul D. Clement of Bancroft PLLC was Counsel of Record for Guardian ad 
Litem, “the duly appointed representative of the respondent child (‘Baby Girl’) . . . with 
standing to file this brief on Baby Girl’s behalf.” Brief for Guardian ad Litem, as 
Representative of Baby Girl, Supporting Reversal at *1, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633603 at *1. 
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The Guardian ad Litem made a two-pronged argument, focusing 
first on interpretation of the ICWA in light of its text and purpose and 
second on the constitutional implications of the South Carolina Supreme 
Court’s decision. 
First, the Guardian ad Litem argued that the lower court incorrectly 
interpreted the ICWA by finding the substantive provisions of the ICWA 
applicable to Baby Girl and treating Biological Father as a “parent.” 
With respect to the former point, the Guardian ad Litem advocated that 
the existing Indian family doctrine served as a bar to application of the 
ICWA: “Throughout [the] ICWA, Congress included language triggered 
only by previous legal or physical custody by the Indian parent, or at 
least some sort of state action preventing the Indian parent from 
obtaining legal or physical custody of the child.”168 On the latter point, 
the Guardian ad Litem argued that the lower court failed to appreciate 
that the ICWA incorporated state or tribal law with respect to the 
procedures necessary to determine paternity: “[T]he lower court ignored 
a much more logical reading of the statute that would explain Congress’ 
decision to use the phrase ‘acknowledged or established’ unelaborated 
and undefined: ICWA meant to incorporate state or tribal law as to when 
unwed father’s paternity is acknowledged or established.”169 
Second, the Guardian ad Litem focused on the constitutional rights 
of Baby Girl. More specifically, the South Carolina Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the ICWA, according to the Guardian ad Litem, 
deprived Baby Girl of “a best interests determination focused [solely] on 
her own well-being,”170 subjected Baby Girl to a racial classification in 
violation of equal protection,
171
 and violated her fundamental liberty 
interests associated “maintaining the only family bonds she has ever 
known, absent a showing of necessity.”172 
 
3. Respondent Biological Father173 
 
Biological Father made four main arguments before the Court, 
 
168. Id. at *29; see also id. at *31-41. 
169. Id. at *29; see also id. at *41-48. 
170. Id. at *30; see also id. at *49-53. 
171. Id. at *53-55. 
172. Id. at *56; see also id. at *56-59. 
173. Charles A. Rothfeld of Mayer Brown LLP was Counsel of Record for 
Respondent Biological Father. See Brief for Respondent Birth Father, Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1191183. 
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urging affirmance of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision. First, 
Biological Father argued that he qualified as a “parent” under the ICWA 
because he “‘acknowledged’ his paternity by declaring that he is Baby 
Girl’s father and bringing suit to establish that fact . . . [and,] he 
‘established’ it through a conclusive DNA test” in conformity with the 
plain meaning of the statute.
174
 Second, Biological Father brushed aside 
Petitioners’ argument that the existing Indian family doctrine should bar 
applicability in the dispute because the “text makes no reference to any 
such doctrine, and the manifest congressional intent—apparent in the 
statutory language, structure, and background—precludes any such ‘pre-
existing custody’ requirement.”175 As a result, Biological Father argued, 
the ICWA’s provisions governing termination of parental rights over an 
Indian child should apply.
176
 Third, Biological Father contended that § 
1915, which provides placement preferences for Indian children, should 
independently block petitioners’ attempted adoption.177 Fourth, 
Biological Father rejected each of the constitutional challenges to the 
ICWA noting that the law does not run afoul of equal protection 
principles because “Congress properly acted on the basis of sovereignty 
rather than race to bolster Tribes as political entities,” the ICWA as-
applied to Baby Girl does not upset federalism given “Congress’ plenary 
power with respect to Indian Tribes,” and “the Court has never 
recognized the extravagant substantive due process rights” claimed by 
Petitioners on behalf of Biological Mother and Baby Girl.
178
 
 
4. Respondent Cherokee Nation179 
 
The Cherokee Nation’s arguments mirrored closely, in substance, 
those of Biological Father. Briefly, the Cherokee Nation argued the 
ICWA applied because Baby Girl is an Indian child under the ICWA, 
which applies to child custody proceedings involving such children and, 
in the alternative, that the ICWA’s substantive placement preferences in 
 
174. Id. at *18; see also id. at *21-27. 
175. Id. at *19; see also id. at *18-19. 
176. Id. at *28-46. 
177. Id. at *46-49. 
178. Id. at *20; see also id. at *49-54. 
179. Chrissi Ross Nimmo, Assistant Attorney General of the Cherokee Nation was 
Counsel of Record for Respondent Cherokee Nation. See Brief for Respondent Cherokee 
Nation, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 
1225770. 
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§ 1915 would require placement with Biological Father.
180
 They also 
suggested that the Court not follow the existing Indian family doctrine, 
which the Cherokee Nation characterized as inconsistent with both the 
text and purpose of the ICWA.
181
 Lastly, relying on Congress’ broad 
power over Indian affairs and the uniquely sovereign status of Indian 
tribes, the Cherokee Nation rejected any equal protection or substantive 
due process challenges to the ICWA.
182
 
5. United States as Amicus Curiae183 
 
Highlighting the importance of the case to relations between the 
federal government and Indian tribes, the United States filed an amicus 
brief supporting affirmance of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s 
decision to award custody to Biological Father.
184
 Relying on the 
“substantial interest [of the United States] in the case because Congress 
enacted ICWA in furtherance of ‘the special relationship between the 
United States and the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal 
responsibility to Indian people,’”185 the United States made a five-
pronged argument in support of affirmance.
186
 
First, the United States argued that the ICWA is applicable to Baby 
Girl’s adoption proceeding, thereby rejecting the existing Indian family 
doctrine because the “ICWA’s plain language forecloses any such 
exemption, and vague appeals to statutory purpose cannot surmount that 
barrier.”187 Second, arguing that Biological Father “established” and 
“acknowledged” his paternity by submitting to a DNA test and pursuing 
state court avenues, the United States suggested that the ICWA did not 
incorporate state law and, even if it did, Biological Father had 
nonetheless complied with South Carolina’s paternity procedures.188 
Third, the United States contended that Biological Father’s parental 
rights could not be terminated because no remedial efforts had been 
 
180. Id. at *12-22. 
181. Id. at *22-27. 
182. Id. at *27-53. 
183. Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. was Counsel of Record for the United 
States. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1099169. 
184. Id. at *8. 
185. Id. at *1 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2012)). 
186. Id. at *8. 
187. Id. at *8; see also id. at *10-14. 
188. Id. at *8; see also id. at *14-19. 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/1
  
2014] TRIBES AND RACE 547 
undertaken as required by 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
189
 Fourth, suggesting that 
the South Carolina Supreme Court’s holding could be affirmed based 
solely on section 1912(d), the United States argued that the Court should 
not address the South Carolina Court’s erroneous conclusion that section 
1912(f) also barred termination of Biological Father’s parental rights 
because “[c]ontinued custody is a predicate to application of” section 
1912(f) and the lower court never determined whether Biological Father 
had the requisite custody.
190
 Fifth, the United States dismissed any of the 
constitutional challenges to the ICWA and its application to Baby Girl by 
referencing Congress’s plenary authority over Indian affairs; rejecting 
equal protection arguments by pointing to the political distinctions, rather 
than racial ones, rooted in tribal sovereignty at play in the ICWA; and 
disregarding any substantive due process right on the part of either Baby 
Girl or Biological Mother to escape Congress’s best interests 
determinations with respect to Indian children.
191
 
 
IV. The Court’s Missed Opportunity in Adoptive Couple 
 
It should come as no surprise that the Court in Adoptive Couple 
avoided addressing the elephant in the room—ICWA’s obvious equal 
protection problem—by stretching and shaping ICWA’s text and purpose 
to suit the Court’s needs. Indeed, the Roberts Court’s legacy may very 
well be characterized by its willingness to apply the canon of 
constitutional avoidance with both rigor and frequency.
192
 This kind of 
judicial humility and restraint is certainly worthy of praise in many 
contexts, but ICWA’s constitutional flaws are so profound and inherent 
 
189. Id. at *8-9; see also id. at *20-23; cf. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (“Any party seeking 
to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child 
under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide 
remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the 
Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”). 
190. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 
183; Id. at *9; see also id. at *23-26. 
191. See id. at *9-10; see also id. at *26-33. 
192. For instance, in the Court’s recent opinion in Bond v. United States, the 
Roberts Court again adopted a strained textual interpretation of a statute in order to avoid 
the obvious constitutional problem central to the case. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. 
Ct. 2077, 2090–93 (2014). Justice Scalia’s concurrence, which embraced Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz’s work in Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005), 
lamented the majority’s decision to avoid the constitutional question. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 
2094–97, 2098 (“Since the Act is clear, the real question this case presents is whether the 
Act is constitutional as applied to petitioner.”). 
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in the law’s substantive provisions that the Court’s refusal to address 
them in Adoptive Couple was lamentable. 
This Part will first summarize and discuss the Court’s decision in 
Adoptive Couple, identifying briefly what issues the Court declined to 
resolve and, while building on the doctrines examined supra, criticizing 
the Adoptive Couple Court’s result. Then, this Part concludes with a 
short epilogue describing the ultimate resolution of Baby Girl’s adoption 
proceedings. 
 
A. What the Court Decided 
 
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the decision of the South 
Carolina Supreme Court and held that ICWA did not bar the termination 
of Biological Father’s parental rights.193 Justice Alito wrote the majority 
opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, 
Kennedy, and Thomas.
194
 Justices Thomas and Breyer filed concurring 
opinions,
195
 while Justices Scalia and Sotomayor (joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia, in part) filed dissenting opinions.
196
 
The majority opinion turned on the Court’s interpretation of two 
provisions of ICWA: section 1912(f), which creates a heightened 
threshold for terminating the parental rights of an Indian child,
197
 and 
section 1912(d), which requires remedial efforts as a precondition to 
breaking up an Indian family.
198
 The Court also clarified the meaning of 
 
193. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013). 
194. Id. at 2556. 
195. Id. at 2566-71 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that constitutional avoidance 
compelled the Court’s opinion because of ICWA’s regulation of Indians individually, 
rather than as tribal members, and ICWA’s potential scope beyond those powers granted 
to Congress via the Indian Commerce Clause); id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(raising policy concerns posed by the Court’s decision and expressing his view regarding 
the limit of the majority opinion). 
196. Id. at 2571-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (offering an alternative definition of 
“continued custody” and lamenting the Court’s demeaning of the rights of parenthood); 
id. at 2572-86 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s reading of ICWA 
as “contrary to both its text and stated purpose” on a host of grounds). 
197. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012) (“No termination of parental rights may be ordered 
in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued 
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child.”). 
198. Id. § 1912(d) (“Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or 
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court 
that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative 
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section 1915(a), which creates placement preferences for adoptions of 
Indian children.
199
 However, the Court’s opinion cannot be understood 
completely without acknowledging the majority’s desire to circumvent 
any constitutional problems posed by ICWA’s unique treatment of 
Indian children and parents: 
 
The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted to help 
preserve the cultural identity and heritage of Indian 
tribes, but under the State Supreme Court’s reading, the 
Act would put certain vulnerable children at a great 
disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a remote 
one—was an Indian. As the State Supreme Court read §§ 
1912(d) and (f), a biological Indian father could abandon 
his child in utero and refuse any support for the birth 
mother—perhaps contributing to the mother’s decision 
to put the child up for adoption—and then could play his 
ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override the 
mother’s decision and the child’s best interests. If this 
were possible, many prospective adoptive parents would 
surely pause before adopting any child who might 
possibly qualify as an Indian under the ICWA. Such an 
interpretation would raise equal protection concerns . . . 
.
200
 
 
Thus, the Court recognized ICWA’s equal protection problems, but came 
to a result via textual interpretation in order to avoid tackling head-on the 
weighty constitutional issues.
201
 Justice Sotomayor understood the 
majority to come to its conclusion based on this justification; although, 
she pointed to the Court’s previous Indian law cases, such as Mancari,202 
to argue that ICWA did not pose any constitutional difficulty: “It is 
 
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have 
proved unsuccessful.”). 
199. Id. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a 
preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement 
with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's 
tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”). 
200. Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2565 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
201. Justice Alito’s opinion, however, purports to identify these equal protection 
problems while claiming to rely on “the plain text of §§ 1912(f) and (d)” in deciding the 
dispute. Id. 
202. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974); see also supra Part II.B.1. 
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difficult to make sense of this suggestion [that a contrary result would 
create equal protection problems] in light of our precedents, which 
squarely hold that classifications based on Indian tribal membership are 
not impermissible racial classifications.”203 
Turning back to the meat of the opinion, the Court’s textual analysis 
focused on section 1912(f) and section 1912(d) of ICWA. The Court 
found that section 1912(f)’s requirement of a heightened showing of 
harm as a prerequisite to termination of parental rights applies only to 
parents with existing custody of an Indian child: “section 1912(f) does 
not apply in cases where the Indian parent never had custody of the 
Indian child . . . [because ‘continued custody’ in section 1912(f)] refers 
to custody that a parent already has (or at least had at some point in the 
past).”204 Thus, because Biological Father “never had legal or physical 
custody of Baby Girl as of the time of the adoption proceedings,” 
Biological Father should not have been able to invoke the protections of 
section 1912(f) to block Baby Girl’s adoption.205 Employing similar 
interpretive tools, the Court found that section 1912(d)’s remedial 
requirements applied only to termination of parental rights where such 
termination would actually breakup the existing family.
206
 More 
precisely, the Court held “that section 1912(d) applies only in cases 
where an Indian family’s ‘breakup’ would be precipitated by the 
termination of the parent’s rights” and defined “[t]he term ‘breakup’ . . . 
in this context [as] ‘the discontinuance of a relationship’ or ‘an ending as 
an effective entity.’”207 Part I.A.2’s discussion of the “existing Indian 
family doctrine” is particularly illuminating and relevant given the 
implicit centrality of the doctrine to the Court’s ultimate holding (with 
respect to section 1912(f) and section 1912(d)).
208
 
 
B. What the Court Left Unanswered 
 
The Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple is, in a sense, a 
quintessential Roberts Court opinion. It is written in such a way as to 
 
203. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing United 
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-
54 (1974)). 
204. Id. at 2560 
205. Id. at 2562. 
206. Id. at 2562-63. 
207. Id. at 2562 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 235 (3d Ed. 1992) and 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 273 (1961)). 
208. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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limit its impact beyond the precise issues before the Court, interpret the 
meaning of the relevant statutory text in a manner that is both not 
unreasonable and consistent with the majority’s broader goals in the 
case, and avoid reaching an outcome that would significantly alter 
precedent and force the Court to decide weighty constitutional questions. 
Looking back to the parties’ arguments, discussed in Part III.C, the Court 
left unanswered two principal issues raised by the parties: first, the 
meaning of “parent” under the ICWA209 and, second, a clear resolution 
of whether the ICWA—and, more broadly, laws generally benefitting or 
classifying Indians—trigger the court’s strict scrutiny level of review 
reserved for racial classifications. 
 
1. ICWA and Putative Fatherhood 
 
First, the Court explicitly declined to resolve the issue of whether 
Biological Father is actually a “parent” under the ICWA: “We need 
not—and therefore do not—decide whether Biological Father is a 
‘parent.’”210 This assumption—necessary for the court to undertake its 
interpretation of § 1912—allowed the Court to avoid a messy discussion 
of the law of putative fatherhood. Recall that a “parent” under the ICWA 
is “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian 
person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions 
under tribal law or custom.”211 However, the ICWA’s definition of parent 
“does not include the unwed father where paternity has not been 
acknowledged or established.”212 
The Court’s decision not to resolve this question of what “parent” 
means is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that this exact issue 
was one of the two questions presented in the case,
213
 and it was a source 
 
209. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560 n.4 (“If Biological Father is not a ‘parent’ 
under the ICWA, then § 1912(f) and § 1912(d)—which relate to proceedings involving 
possible termination of ‘parental’ rights—are inapplicable. Because we conclude that 
these provisions are inapplicable for other reasons, however, we need not decide whether 
Biological Father is a ‘parent.’”). 
210. Id. at 2560. 
211. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012). 
212. Id. 
213. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. 
Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2012 WL 4502948 at *i (“(2) [w]hether ICWA defines 
‘parent’ in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) to include an unwed biological father who has not 
complied with state law rules to attain legal status as a parent.”). 
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of disagreement among the parties.
214
 Part III.C briefly outlined the 
parties’ arguments on this issue, among others.215 By declining to resolve 
this debate surrounding the ICWA’s interaction with putative fatherhood 
doctrine, the Court was also able to sidestep the question, examined in 
Part I.B of whether the ICWA’s definition of parent imported state law 
paternity requirements or was limited to the ICWA’s own statutory 
meaning.
216
 Thus, the majority maintained the status quo ante with 
respect to the Court’s putative fatherhood jurisprudence. 
There is already wide disagreement among many states, the 
populations of which account for a significant share of this country’s 
Indian population, about how to interpret ICWA’s definition of “parent.” 
These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Missouri, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas.
217
 The Court’s decision does 
nothing to resolve this inconsistency in the state courts. Unfortunately, 
both America’s Indian population of unwed fathers and prospective 
adoptive parents of this community’s children are left to fight these 
issues in state courts with little hope of consistent application of ICWA 
across state lines. 
 
2. The Equal Protection Problem 
 
Second, and most importantly, the Court completely and 
purposefully avoided any resolution of the weighty equal protection 
issues raised in Adoptive Couple. Aside from a few sentences alluding to 
the potential constitutional problems that might result from application of 
the ICWA to Baby Girl’s adoption,218 the Court used the ICWA’s 
statutory text as a useful life raft to avoid the choppy waters of ICWA’s 
fundamental equal protection flaws. All of the parties briefed the 
 
214. Compare Brief for Petitioners at 19-29, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. 
Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597, at *19-29, and Brief for Guardian ad 
Litem at 31-48, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 
WL 633603 at *31-48, with Brief for Respondent Cherokee Nation at 12-22, Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1225770, at *12-22, 
and Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14-19, 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1099169, at 
*14-19. 
215. See supra Part III.C. 
216. See supra Part I.B. 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48. 
218. See supra text accompanying note 200. 
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constitutional issues to some degree,
219
 and as Part II made abundantly 
clear, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence with respect to both 
adoption and laws implicating Indians are in serious need of 
reevaluation.
220
 Adoptive Couple was the ideal opportunity for such an 
undertaking by the Court. 
More specifically, the Court’s failure to address the obvious equal 
protection issues at play in ICWA will only perpetuate the legal fiction 
necessary to justify rational basis of review of Indian classifications: that 
tribal classifications do not act as or implicate racial classifications. 
Recall ICWA’s definitions of “Indian Child:” “any unmarried person 
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or 
(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological 
child of a member of an Indian tribe.”221 These provisions explicitly 
require a biological link to tribal members by pointing toward tribal 
membership (or eligibility) to trigger ICWA’s application. Given the 
reality that tribal membership is linked to one’s biological ties to 
previously recognized tribal members,
222
 this kind of biological 
requirement is quite obviously a racial one. The Court’s failure to 
acknowledge this reality will only perpetuate the divisive nature of laws, 
like ICWA, that afford Indians disparate treatment based, at least in part, 
on their racial heritage. 
This Article is not alone in scholarship in recognizing the racial 
nature of such classifications,
223
 and even the Ninth Circuit in Babbitt—
discussed in Part II.B.2—felt compelled to strike down an agency 
interpretation of the Reindeer Industry Act in light of the clear racial 
nature of tribal classifications in order to avoid a constitutionally 
troubling outcome.
224
 Until the Court resolves this contradiction in its 
increasing embrace of colorblindness in equal protection cases, ICWA 
and similar laws will perpetuate disparate treatment of Indians under the 
law and condition application of such legislative measures on one’s 
 
219. See supra Part III.C. 
220. See supra Part II; see also infra Part IV.C. 
221. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012). 
222. See, e.g., text accompanying note 105. 
223. See supra Part II.B.1. 
224. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The constitutional 
questions raised by the IBIA's interpretation are grave and, as intervenors and amici point 
out, implicate an entire title of the United States Code. We see no reason to unnecessarily 
resolve them when a less constitutionally troubling construction is readily available. We 
therefore interpret the Reindeer Act as not precluding non-natives in Alaska from owning 
and importing reindeer.” (footnote omitted)). 
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blood heritage. What could be more anathema to the text and spirit of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equality under the law? 
 
C. An Epilogue 
 
Throughout the remarkable and dramatic saga of Adoptive Couple, a 
young child’s future was ultimately hanging in the balance. This human 
element was heart-wrenching and made the case that much more worthy 
of careful consideration and resolution. The United States Supreme 
Court’s decision did not, however, resolve ultimately what would happen 
to Baby Girl. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court responded to the United States 
Supreme Court’s reversal and remand by ordering the family court to 
approve and finalize “Adoptive Couple’s adoption of Baby Girl, thereby 
terminating [Biological] Father’s parental rights.”225 The South Carolina 
Supreme Court subsequently denied petitions for rehearing submitted by 
Biological Father and the Cherokee Nation, leaving only unresolved 
“[t]he matter of transfer of physical custody” of Baby Girl, to be 
determined by the family court in accordance with Baby Girl’s best 
interests.
226
 
Unfortunately, that transfer was accompanied by further drama: 
after Biological Father—who was engaged in annual military training 
with his Oklahoma National Guard unit in Iowa
227—failed to appear with 
Baby Girl on August 4, 2013 in South Carolina for a court-ordered 
meeting with Adoptive Couple as part of the transition of custody plan, 
South Carolina authorities issued a warrant for the arrest of Biological 
Father.
228
 After legal wrangling, additional lawsuits, and a political 
 
225. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51, 54 (S.C. 2013). 
226. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 346, 347 (S.C. 2013). 
227. A Cherokee tribal court granted temporary custody of Baby Girl to Biological 
Father’s parents and wife while he was attending Oklahoma National Guard training. See 
Dan Frosch, Custody Battle Continues Despite Ruling by Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/us/custody-battle-continues-despite-ruling-
by-
justices.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%5B%22RI%3A5%22%2
C%22RI%3A16%22%5D. 
228. See, e.g., Meg Kinnard, Adoptive Couple Wants Feds to Bring Girl to SC, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 12, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/adoptive-couple-wants-feds-
bring-girl-sc-125306465.html; Dusten Brown, ‘Baby Girl’ Veronica’s Birth Father, 
Faces Arrest Warrant in Adoption Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 10, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/11/sc-authorities-issue-warrant-dusten-
brown_n_3739674.html. 
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standoff between the governors of Oklahoma and South Carolina,
229
 
Adoptive Couple finally gained custody of Baby Girl on September 23, 
2013.
230
 Weeks later, Biological Father announced that he would drop all 
litigation aimed at gaining custody of Baby Girl, saying that “[i]t was no 
longer fair for [Baby Girl] to be in the middle of a battle.”231 
Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court’s doctrinal 
failure—and the pain and anguish felt by all parties involved in this 
case—perhaps the silver lining in this saga is the fact that Baby Girl 
might have a settled and fulfilling future after all. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Supreme Court was presented with the ideal opportunity to both 
rectify its approach to laws singling out Indian tribal members for 
disparate treatment and provide clarification regarding the ICWA’s 
application to putative fathers. On both fronts, the Court failed to provide 
any meaningful resolution. With respect to the first issue, federal law 
will regrettably continue to ignore the intrinsic racial nature of any tribal 
classification, thereby perpetuating the legal fiction necessary to sustain 
the Court’s deferential approach to resolving equal protection challenges 
to laws implicating Indian tribes. The ICWA will persist as an awkward 
exception to the Court’s otherwise steady embrace of colorblindness, in 
adoption and beyond. 
The Court’s refusal to resolve the ICWA’s ambiguity regarding 
putative fatherhood rights is similarly disappointing and leaves putative 
fathers, Indian children, and adoptive couples uncertain about the scope 
of the ICWA’s application. Given the existing conflict among the 
states—many of which having sizable populations impacted by the 
ICWA—on this question of the ICWA’s scope, the Court will likely be 
 
229. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court’s Ruling in Baby Veronica Case 
Leads to More Legal Wrangling, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-courts-ruling-in-baby-veronica-case-
leads-to-more-legal-wrangling-over-adoption/2013/09/15/7207be1c-1caf-11e3-8685-
5021e0c41964_story.html. 
230. Cherokee Girl Is Handed Over to Adoptive Parents, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/us/cherokee-girl-is-handed-over-to-adoptive-
parents.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%5B%22RI%3A5%22%2
C%22RI%3A16%22%5D. 
231. Michael Overall, Baby Veronica Case: Dusten Brown To Stop Custody Fight 
for Veronica, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/baby-
veronica-case-dusten-brown-to-stop-custody-fight-for/article_2d903520-319a-11e3-abf1-
0019bb30f31a.html. 
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forced to take up this question again soon, as is often the case when the 
Court leaves tough questions for future resolution. 
Judicial restraint and humility are often laudable characteristics of a 
praiseworthy tribunal, but the Court in Adoptive Couple should not have 
left open these profound questions of constitutional uncertainty. 
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